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Unfair Competition in Intellectual Products in the
Public Domain
Marian R. Nathan*
A RECENT FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CASE, Grove Press, Inc. v. Collector's
Publication, Inc.,1 illustrates another attempt by our judiciary to
find its way out of the immense entanglement of copyright infringement
in statutory law and unfair competition in common law besetting prop-
erties in the public domain. Two 1964 United States Supreme Court
decisions 2 have further complicated the positions of both creators and
judiciary.
Consider that you had been fortunate enough to locate one of the
three remaining original copies of a racy nineteenth century European
novel; had purchased the rights to put your staff to work in Germany
copying and updating it editorially; invested an additional $23,000.00 in
printing type and plates; applied for and received a United States
derivative copyright on your changed version; and finally published
your book. Just when you had settled back comfortably to recover your
investment and let the profits roll in, you learn that someone else has
simply photographed your version and is about to market it at one-half
the price.
These are substantially the facts in the Grove Press case involving
"My Secret Life," a rather explicit sexual autobiography of a nineteenth
century English gentleman. Surprisingly, the court found relief to be in
unfair competition in spite of the prima facie case3 created by plaintiff's
possession of a Certificate of Copyright Registration.4 The 1967 Grove
decision provided the impetus for this essay on the present confusing
laws governing unfair competition in intellectual products that have be-
come a part of the public domain.
Public domain is the other side of the coin of copyright in the fields
of literature, drama, music and art.5 It lacks the private property ele-
ment granted under copyright in that there is no legal right to exclude
* B.S., Ohio State Univ.; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School;
Executive, Burdette Oxygen Co. (Cleveland).
1 246 F.Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
2 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3 Drop Dead Co. v. S. C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963).
4 Supra note 1 at 606. The court said, "Since the new matter in the Grove edition
was trivial, the Grove edition is uncopyrightable as a derivative work or otherwise.
In reaching this conclusion the Court has recognized that a Certificate of Copyright
Registration is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, 17 U.S.C. § 209, but
this presumption has been sufficiently dispelled."
5 Krasililowsky, Observations on Public Domain, 14 Bull. Cr. Soc. 205 (1967).
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others from enjoying it, and is "free as the air to common use." 6 Whether
a work is in the public domain by reason of expiration, abandonment, or
non-copyrightability, the effect is the same; it may be made and sold
by whoever chooses to do so, and the right to share in its goodwill is
possessed by all.
7
Statutory and Common Law Aspects
Save for the limited protection accorded creators of literary or in-
tellectual works under the Federal Copyright Act," and its exceptions,
anyone may freely and with impunity avail himself of such works to any
extent he may desire and for any purpose whatever, subject only to
the qualification that he does not steal goodwill or deceive others into
thinking such creations represent his own work.
The copyright clause of the Constitution secures to authors the ex-
clusive right to their "writings." 9 This term is not limited to actual
scripts but includes all tangible expressions of intellectual creation.' 0
Works of art (i.e., sculptures and paintings) are, therefore, assumed
to be within the constitutional protection.1 1 Interestingly, phonographic
recordings have not been included under the statutory "writings" um-
brella.12
The common law recognizes a property right in the products of
man's creative mind, regardless of the form in which the products may
take expression."3 The common law right to literary property precedes
the constitutional protection and was not in any way affected by enact-
ment of the copyright laws,'1 4 with the exception that upon publication
or upon availing himself of the copyright laws one loses the correspond-
ing common law rights. 5 When a work is sold or otherwise made
available to the public without restriction to use or class of users it is
classified as a general publication.1 Limited publication is a communi-
cation of the work, restricted both as to persons and purpose, under cir-
6 Dissent of Justice Brandeis, International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918).
7 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
8 U.S. Const. art 1, § 8 ei 8; 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
9 U.S. Const. art 1, § 8 cl. 8.
10 Nimmer, Copyright § 8.2 (1963).
11 Nimmer, op. cit. supra note 10.
12 See, generally, Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 185 (1956).
13 Kimmel v. White, 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
14 Ibid.
15 Id.
16 Supra note 12.
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cumstances showing no dedication to the public. 17 Only a general publi-
cation results in the loss of common law copyright.' 8
Title 17 of the United States Code contains the statutory law ap-
plicable to cases involving intellectual products of the public domain. 9
Most frequently applied are sections 8 and 7, which read, in part, as
follows:
Section 8. No copyright shall subsist in the original text of any
work which is in the public domain or in any work which was
published in this country or any foreign country prior to July 1,
1909 and has not been already copyrighted in the United States, or
in any publication of the United States Government, or any reprint
in the whole or in part thereof .. .20
Section 7. Compilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrange-
ments, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of works in the
public domain .. .or work republished with new matter, shall be
regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of
this title, but the publication of any such new works shall not .. .
be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original
works. ..21
The degree of protection afforded is measured by what is actually
copyrightable, and, hence, when one takes matter in the public domain
and adds material which is the result of his own efforts, the copyright
which he takes out is valid as to the new and original matter only and
does not remove from the public domain that which the author by his
own act has dedicated to the public.2 2
The Federal District Courts are given exclusive original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions arising under the copyright laws of the United
States and of all civil actions asserting a claim of unfair competition
when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright
laws.2 ' However, failure to establish infringement of copyright in a suit
for injunction, damages and an accounting does not deprive the federal
court of jurisdiction to determine the merits of a claim that the acts
complained of also constitute unfair competition. 24
17 White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. den. 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
18 Wm. A. Meir Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F.Supp 264 (W.D. Pa.
1951).
19 17 U.S.C. § 1-216 (1958).
20 Ibid. § 8.
21 Id. § 7.
22 Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1960); American Code Co. v. Benarize,
282 F. 829 (2d Cir. 1922); Kipling v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 120 F. 631 (2d Cir. 1903).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (b).
24 Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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The Conflict
The right to prevent unauthorized copying per se is based on federal
statutes, while the right to prevent or recover damages for the unfairly
competing sale of the copies is a common law right generally assumed to
owe its existence to the respective states.25 Immediately jurisdictional
questions arise, as well as the question of which law should be applied
by the federal courts, with respect to unfair competition when there
has been a joinder of copyright infringement and unfair competition
claims into a single cause of action within the jurisdiction of the federal
court system.
Let's look, for example, at a 1965 case involving the best-selling
novel "Candy." 20 The plaintiffs, publishers and author, brought out a
hard-cover English language edition in France but neglected to apply
for an ad interim copyright in the United States. Subsequently plain-
tiffs did produce and publish a revised version which they copyrighted
here. A short while later defendants published a paperback edition of
the original "Candy" and plaintiffs brought a joinder action for copy-
right infringement and unfair competition. A New York federal court,
after finding plaintiff's copyright invalid for technical reasons, determined
that the defendants did not copy (an infringement term) nor appropriate
(an unfair competition term) the plaintiff's version of "Candy" but had
utilized an independent public domain source to complete its edition.
Compare this with the opinion in which Judge Hill, having found
the Grove version of "My Secret Life" uncopyrightable, stated the rule
as follows: "In view of plaintiff's expenditure of substantial sums in
setting type and engraving plates, it would constitute unfair competi-
tion for defendants to appropriate the value and benefit of such expendi-
tures to themselves by photographing and reproducing plaintiff's book
through the offset-lithography process, thereby cutting their own costs
and obtaining an unfair competitive advantage." 27
From these instances of uncopyrighted and uncopyrightable novels
in the public domain, shouldn't defendant's paperback of "Candy,"
have been found as grandiose an act of appropriation and as morally
wrong as defendant's photographed version of "My Secret Life"? More-
over, the "Candy" decision provided us with a look at another inequity
in our laws of this area-the United States non-recognition of the moral
right, or droit moral-a compound of the personal rights an author has
25 For an enlightening comparison in this area, see McGuire, Common Law Over-
tones of Statutory Copyright: An Inquiry into the Status of a Federal Common Law
of Unfair Competition, 13 ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 33 (1964).
26 G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Lancer Books, Inc., 239 F.Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
27 Supra note 1 at 607.
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in his work.28 The interest of the author or artist in the integrity of
his work and in preventing uses inconsistent with his standards or repu-
tation are not recognized by the federal statute29 which was enacted to
implement the constitutional mandate "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." " Moral rights spring not from liberty or equality but from
dignity, a third quality marking man's noblest state. Paradoxically, they
are not constitutionally acknowledged in a country dedicated to the be-
lief in the worth of the individual. 31
Another right not given recognition in the United States is droit de
suite-the right of an artist "to share in the money which changes hands
upon sales of his work subsequent to the one by which he parted with
it." 32 This right is recognized in France, Belgium, Uruguay and Italy,33
and in a proposed German law.34 Under the Berne Convention it is pro-
tected on a reciprocal basis.35 Protection will probably be afforded to
American artists in the countries which recognize droit de suite and
which are members of the Universal Copyright Convention.3"
Effects of Two 1964 Cases
Obviously the "Candy" opinion was influenced by the famous 1964
United States Supreme Court companion decisions, Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co. 37 and Compco Corp. v. Day Bright Lighting, Inc.38
Sears and Compco hold generally that if an item is not protected by
either patent or copyright anyone may copy it with impunity, and State
laws of unfair competition are inadequate to protect against copying.
These cases made clear that public interest in free competition out-
weighs the interest which gave rise to the law of unfair competition. 39
28 Kury, Protection for Creators in the United States and Abroad, 13 ASCAP Copy-
right Law Symposium 1 (1964); also see Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and
American Copyright Law: A Proposal, 4 ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 79
(1952).
29 Kury, op. cit. supra note 28, at 2; supra note 28.
30 U.S. Const. art 1 § 8.
31 Kury, op. cit. supra note 28, at 31; infra, note 78.
32 UNESCO, Study of Comparative Copyright Law, 2-3 UNESCO Copyright Bull. 136
(1949).
33 Ibid.
34 Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
privileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 1
(1962).
35 Id. at 17-19.
36 Kury, op. cit. supra note 28, at 10, supra n. 28.
37 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
38 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
39 Treece, Protectability of Product Differentiation: Is and Aught Compared, 18 Rut-
gers L. Rev. 1019 (1964).
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The rationale behind the constitutional and statutory limitations upon
patent and copyright protection is that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest progress.
40
The Sears case involved pole lamps, and Compco concerning ceiling
lighting fixtures. However, since they were decided on the same day,
and the facts and decisions are so similar, they are seemingly spoken of
as one case. Sears manufactured a pole lamp almost identical to Stiffel's
and sold it for much less. An Illinois District Court found plaintiff's pat-
ent invalid because there was no evidence of a genuine invention or dis-
covery, but, nevertheless, enjoined Sears from selling pole lamps identical
or confusingly similar to Stiffel's, after finding that Sears had caused con-
fusion by producing a copy of plaintiff's lamp almost identical to the
original both in appearance and in functional detail. The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed,4 1 with the reasoning that to prove a case of unfair com-
petition under Illinois law there was no need to show that Sears had been
palming off its lamps as Stiffel's lamps, but rather Stiffel had only to
show that the two articles were so alike that customers could not identify
the manufacturers. Unexpectedly, the Supreme Court reversed, with a
federal pre-emption rationale, that because of Federal patent laws, a
State may not, when an article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, pro-
hibit the copying of the article itself, and that where the pole lamp sold
by Sears was not entitled to the protection of either a design or mechani-
cal patent, Sears had the right to copy the design and sell lamps almost
identical to those sold by Stiffel. The Court stated, ". . it (the state)
cannot, under some other law, such as forbidding unfair competition, give
protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws." 42
Professor Nimmer, in his oft-quoted treatise, gives his analysis of
the final Sears and Compco decisions as follows: "These cases seem to
establish that non-patentable lamps may not be protected against copy-
ing under state law of unfair competition since by withholding federal
protection under the patent and copyright law Congress has expressed
a policy to permit copying, which under the Supremacy Clause may not
be subverted by contrary state laws. Sears and Compco do no invalidate
a state law of unfair competition based on (1) deceptive or fraudulent
practices as in palming off or (2) the use of identical product of
another." 43
40 Stern and Hoffman, Public Inquiry and the Public Intent: Secondary Meaning in
the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 935 (1962).
41 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
42 376 U.S. at 231 (1964).
43 Nimmer, Copyright 145 (1963).
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Sears and Compco have thrown the law of unfair competition into
its present unstable and uncertain condition; however, in an examina-
tion of cases decided since 1964 it appears that the Courts are most un-
willing to extend the doctrine even slightly; the tendency, in fact has
been to keep the rule within as narrow bounds as possible.
In Greater Recording Co., Inc. v. Stambler,44 the plaintiff brought
an action for unfair competition, alleging that defendant had pirated a
phonograph record produced and distributed by him. Through elec-
tronic and mechanical means defendants had dubbed off the sound from
plaintiff's record and affixed the identical sounds to a master and released
the records embodying plaintiff's sounds under his own label. Defendant
moved for dismissal based upon the Sears and Compco holdings. The
motion to dismiss was denied. The Court said that the plaintiff was
seeking protection "against unlawful misappropriation of property" 4
and denied the motion in all respects.
Similarly, in Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.,40
plaintiff brought an action for damages based upon the exhibition by
defendants of a motion picture on television into which was alleged in-
corporation of a substantial segment of plaintiff's motion picture which
had not been copyrighted. Here, too, defendants moved for dismissal
based upon the Sears and Compco holdings. The Court denied the mo-
tion, stating:
Whether his cause be denominated as sounding in "unfair competi-
tion" or "intentional interference with economic or contractual re-
lations," this Court cannot, in view of the background of juris-
prudence and decisional law in this area, hold that these recent
decisions (Sears and Compco) which involved distinguishable
factual situations wiped clear the slate of precedent and em-
powered the unauthorized appropriation of artistic performances
to the profit of others.4 7
In distinguishing Sears and Compco, the Court pointed out that in those
cases "the Court was concerned with the copying of an unpatented and
uncopyrighted product. This is to be distinguished from the instant case,
where the complaint, essentially, is of an appropriation of the very item
licensed." 48
International News Service Case
Property rights in intellectual products have long been recognized
in this country. The landmark case in this area is International News
44 144 U.S.P.Q. 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
45 Id.
46 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36
(1964).
47 Id. at 462.
48 Id.
Jan. 1969
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Service v. Associated Press,49 the gist of which was extremely well
stated in the Court's reference to it in the Axelbank v. Rony opinion:
"Appropriation of another's work product, even if the work product is
uncopyrightable, can nevertheless be a form of unfair competition with
the original creator of that product." 5)
The parties in International News Service case were competitors in
the gathering and distribution of news. The French government had
denied access to war news to International News Service agents who,
thereafter, ingeniously copied the news from AP bulletin boards and
bribed AP employees to obtain it. The International News Service then
sold the pirated news to AP's western seaboard member papers. The
Court, notwithstanding publication by AP, found this to be unfair com-
petition, explaining that although a news article in a newspaper may
be copyrighted, news, as such, is not copyrightable. But, more sig-
nificantly, they found that one who gathers news at pain and expense,
for the purpose of gain, may be said to have quasi-property right in the
results of his enterprise as against a rival in the same business. The
appropriation of those results at the expense and damage of the one
and for the profit of the other is unfair competition against which equity
will afford relief. To constitute unfair competition under the factual
circumstances of the International News Service case, it was essential
that there be present an appropriation of another's work product-the
so-called "free ride doctrine." In other words, there has been a free
ride on the product rather than the reputation of the creator.
Professor Zacariah Chaffee, Jr., in a repeatedly cited and extremely
interesting article,51 termed the INS activities "upsidedown passing off,"
for INS was not passing off its news as if it originally came from the
AP, but rather that INS was supplying AP news as if it were its own.
This "upsidedown passing off" idea has since become known as the Mis-
appropriation Doctrine. Chief Justice Hughes said in 1938 with reference
to the International News Service case: "Unfair competition as known
to the common law is a limited concept. Primarily and strictly it relates
to the palming off of one's goods as those of a rival trader . . . In recent
years, its scope has been extended. It has been held to apply to mis-
appropriation, as well as misrepresentation, to the selling of another's
goods as one's own-to misappropriate on of what equitably belongs to
a competitor." 52
In a 1965 case, Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown
Broadcast Co.,5 3 an action was brought for violation of federal copyright
49 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
50 Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1960).
51 Chaffee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289-1315 (1940).
52 A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 at 531-32 (1935).
53 247 F.Supp. 581 (E.D.Pa. 1965).
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laws and unfair competition based upon defendant broadcasting com-
pany's appropriation of plaintiff's 3 A.M. local news for broadcast at 6
A.M. The Court found that defendant's unauthorized use of local news
items gathered by the plaintiff through specialized methods and trained
personnel would constitute a violation of a property right and unfair
competition completely contrary to the Sears and Compco decisions
which disallow all such protection for proprietary interests. Further, the
court found that the state courts have jurisdiction over causes of action
for invasion of a property right or unfair competition even if tied in with
a substantially related infringement claim over which federal courts
have jurisdiction.5 4 Here, "piracy" was involved, and this can be
remedied in the state courts.
While it has been said that the INS property rights rationale on
unfair competition is no longer valid because of the doctrine of Sears
and Compco,55 surely a great deal of resistance has arisen, and in cases
of outright appropriation, or misappropriation, INS principles seem to
have survived Sears and Compco.;5  Oftentimes, the resistance appears
to be pure valor as in the Flamingo case. 57 In the Pottstown Daily News
Publishing Co. case the court also bravely tried to distinguish the INS
doctrine from the impact of Sears and Compco saying: "Men of con-
science would hardly condone such an inequitable result and we, as a
court of conscience, will not subscribe to such a conclusion unless the
Supreme Court enlightens us with a clear ruling on this specific prob-
lem." 58
Repeatedly we have encountered the words "copy" and "appropri-
ate" and the efforts of the various courts to establish a reasonable line
of demarcation using "copy" in the clear infringement situation and "ap-
propriate" whenever they thought a finding in unfair competition to be
the answer. Many feel that one of the most deplorable results of Sears
and Compco is their seeming endorsement of a lowered standard of
commercial morality, a laxness in sticking to clean "rules of the business
54 Contra, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (b).
5 CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, Capital Cities Broadcasting Corp. v. Same, CBS Films, Inc.
v. Same, 153 U.S.P.Q. 649 (1st Cir. 1967). J. Coffin, ". . . The leading case affording a
remedy for mere copying, International News Service v. Associated Press, 1918 ...is no longer authoritative . . .it has been clearly overruled by the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Sears .. .and Compco ..."; Treece, Patent Policy and Preemp-
tion: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U.Chi. L. Rev. 80, 95 (1964) "Compco andStiffel can be regarded as marking the (misappropriation) doctrine's final demise."
56 Supra note 1; Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2 Cir.
1951), N.Y. World's Fair 1954-65 Corp. v. Colcurpicture Publishers, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q.939 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1964), aff'd mem. 21 App.Div.2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dept.1964); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. 20th Century Fox, Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264
F.Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
57 Supra note 46.
58 Supra note 53.
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game." 59 But what significant difference is there, from the moral view-
point, between one who copies and one who appropriates? Aren't the
courts continuing to grope in their efforts to make the differentiation in
terminology and subsequent treatment? Indeed, in recent cases aren't
we again involved with property rights despite Sears and Compco's
denial of protection to such interests?
For example, in Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc.,60 defendant
counter-claimed that plaintiff's community antenna system was inter-
fering with its exclusive contractual right to telecast certain television
programs and was likewise indulging in acts of unfair competition.
Plaintiff's community antenna received identical programs broadcast by
other and more distant stations and distributed them within the area
of defendant's signal. Defendant did not claim copyright on the pro-
grams involved. A preliminary injunction was granted defendant, from
which the plaintiff appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the holding
that Sears and Compco precluded any relief unless defendant could
demonstrate an interest protected by virtue of the copyright laws in net-
work TV programs or bring themselves within contemplation of some
other recognized exception to policy promoting free access to all matter
in the public domain. The court, however, made this significant ob-
servation: "Anyone may freely and with impunity avail himself of such
(uncopyrighted) works to any extent he may desire and for any pur-
pose whatever, subject only to the qualification that he does not steal
goodwill, or perhaps more accurately stated, deceive others into think-
ing the creations represent his own work." 61
100 Years of Vacillation
In 1940 Rudolf Callmann wrote, referring to a line of trade directory
cases0 2 decided in the 1860's:
The common element in the above unfair competition cases is the
appropriation of competitor's work, which is adapted to serve the de-
fendant's need and then turned against its author in the economic
struggle. The unfair use, evident in the string of English cases, can-
not be prevented by the copyright law if the catalogue or directory
is not of artistic originality unless we wish to create a copyright
regardless of any value or artistic merit of the works subject to it.
Where the unfairness of the use consists of the appropriation of
another's labor and money, the outcome of the litigation should not
59 Statement of Sidney A. Diamond at Hearing on HR 4651 before the sub-committee
on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963).
60 335 F.2d 348 (9 Cir. 1964).
61 Id. at 351.
62 Kelly v. Morris, L.R.I. Eq. 697 (1866); Morris v. Ashbie, L.R. 7 Eq. 34 (1868);
Morris v. Wright L.R. 5 Ch. Ap. 279 (1870); Pike v. Nicholas, L.R. 5 Ch. Ap. 251(1869).
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depend upon whether or not the form of the catalogue or directory
is sufficiently ingenious to receive copyright protection.63
In other words, intellectual products in the public domain were not
provided sufficient protection against unsavory competitive practices by
the copyright laws of 1860, 1940, or 1958.
This remains true in 1968. As late as 1967 the judge in Grove Press6 4
discovered that the situation had not improved, and that it was still
necessary to resort to common law relief in unfair competition, con-
cluding: "Unfair appropriation of the property of a competitor is unfair
competition and redressable in a situation of this kind despite the hold-
ing in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiff el; 05 Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright
Lighting, Inc.; 3 Greater Recording Co. v. Stambler; 37 Flamingo Tele-
film Sales Inc. v. United Artists Corp.,"s and Cable Vision, Inc. v.
KUTV, Inc." 69
Twenty-eight years ago Professor Chaffee suggested three possible
concepts the courts might consider in dealing with unfair competition.
These were his theories of:
Conservatism-Unfair competition should be stopped where it is.
Conquest -Opposite of Conservatism advocating that the time is
now ripe to extend unfair competition over all its
popular means, namely, every unfairness by a com-
petitor.
Exploration -A middle road wherein the courts should, instead of
rushing blindly into a great unmapped territory, feel
their way cautiously out beyond the passing off
cases and block out a few kinds of standardized
wrongs.70
In their application to situations involving literary properties of the
public domain, the courts have, without a doubt, been travelling Pro-
fessor Chaffee's trail of Exploration and are finding the path delicately
arduous, often deciding to go back and around rather than cross the
Sears and Compco chasms of controversy. They are plodding on, how-
ever, and in a span of 100 years have blocked out only the Misappropria-
tion Doctrine and the established palming off theory. It's quite apparent
that the going is complicated and slow.
63 Callman, Copyright and Unfair Competition, 2 La. L. Rev. 648 (1940).
64 Supra note 1.
65 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
66 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
67 144 U.S.P.Q. 547 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1965).
68 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1964) (rev'd. on other grounds 254 N.Y.S.2d 36,
1964).
69 335 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1964).
70 See, generally, Chaffee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 Har. L. Rev. 1289 (1940).
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Interestingly, the "My Secret Life" decision revealed delicately
balanced, yet increased exploration by our courts into this area. After
enjoining defendant's first edition as unfair appropriation of the property
of a competitor, 7 1 in the same opinion Judge Hill continued to zealously
guard public domain material by denying plaintiff's request for an in-
junction against defendant's second version of "My Secret Life" which
had been prepared from the original text recreated with the aid of
plaintiff's edition.72 The Judge's skillful conclusion that plaintiff's forty
thousand changes in the original manuscript were trivial,73 thereby in-
validating the plaintiff's Certificate of Copyright, 4 was also a slap at
incompatible sections of the Copyright Law.7 5 But, despite the Judge's
valiant dissection, very little definitive law resulted.
Pursuit of Chaffee's exploration theory has found our judiciary
undertaking the gigantic task of court direction of business activities by
determinations that certain trade practices are unfair. Undoubtedly,
they have been forced to delve into areas where they are thoroughly
novice and unfamiliar. How can our judges be expected to possess
expertise on the diverse fine points of an "Acy-Ducy" game,76 piracy
of television programs, 77 mezzo-tint engravings of old masters, 78 and
fabric designs? 79 The court systems have realized the extent of the
task being asked of them, coupled with the lack of clear law on unfair
competition involvement in artistic and intellectual products, and for this
reason have been treading with extreme caution. Should they condone,
or enjoin, certain competitive practices, they would virtually be creating
monopolies of their own which, properly, they are reluctant to do.
Momentous and Solomon-like decisions have been required of
judges, especially those in the entertainment centers of the Second and
Ninth Circuits from which most of these public domain literary works
in unfair competition actions seem to stem. Are they, in working with
a bare minimum of conflicting standards, considered more qualified than
71 264 F.Supp. at 607.
72 Ibid.
73 Id. at 605.
74 Id. at 606; supra note 63, bearing out Callman's prediction of inadequate copyright
protection.
75 17 U.S.C. § 209; 17 U.S.C. § 7; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 250 (1903) "All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute
is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation,
something recognizable as his own. Originality in this concept means little more
than a prohibition of actual copying. No matter how poor artistically the 'author's'
addition, it is enough if it be his own."
76 Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945).
77 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
78 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
79 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S.
728 (1930).
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Congress to reconcile freedom of competition and morality with the Fed-
eral Copyright Act?
Current Congressional Attention
Congress, thankfully, is also working on this labyrinth in an effort
to provide some assistance to the courts. In the 90th Congress there are
pending several bills involving complete revisions of the Patent,O
Trademark (generally regarded as a branch of the broad law of unfair
competition) 1 and Copyright Laws8 2 as well as a proposed Federal
Unfair Competition Statute.s 3 Bills covering the general revision of the
Copyright Law have already been passed by the House, and the Senate
has almost concluded hearings on this legislation s 4 However, on No-
vember 2, 1967, the House Judiciary Committee found it necessary to
approve a Senate-passed temporary measure to extend expiring copy-
rights through 1968 while Congress completed action on the long range
reform bills.8 5
In the Copyright Law revision area one of the major changes is
extension of the term of a copyright from the present twenty-eight years
(renewable for another twenty-eight) to the period of the life of the
author plus fifty years, a term common in international copyright law.
This development would have warmed the hearts of such authors as
Noah Webster,8 6 Samuel Clemens, s 7 and Edna Ferber,8 8 all of whom
spent considerable time and money vociferously advocating just such an
extension to protect their moral rights and droit de suite as creators.
Another proposed change would bring unpublished as well as published
works under the Federal Copyright Act. There are also under con-
sideration provisions to provide protection in the CATV as well as com-
puter storage and retrieval fields.
An effort was made in the Proposed Unfair Competition Act of
1966s 9 to reconcile the Sears and Compco impass with INS. Policy Four
of the bill reads: "In the light of Compco and Sears to affirm the power
80 S. 1042; H.R. 5924; H.R. 6043; H.R. 6975, 90th Congress at 1st Session (1967).
81 S. 1154, 90th Congress, 1st Session (1967).
82 H.R. 11947; H.R. 12354, 88th Congress 2d Session (1964).
83 McClellan S. 3681, 89th Congress 2d Session (1966).
84 Neuhauser, Sweeping Changes in Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Pending
in Congress. 34 D.C.B.J. 19 (Aug. 1967).
85 UPI Washington; Cleveland Plain Dealer.
86 Letters of Noah Webster (to Senator Daniel Webster) (Library Publishing Co.,
New York, 1926).
87 Samuel Longhorne Clemens (Mark Twain), 180 No. American Review 1 (1905);
Hudson, Mark Twain and the Copyright Dilemma, 52 A.B.A.J. 56 (Jan. 1966).
88 Edna Ferber, A Kind of Magic (Doubleday, New York, 1963).
89 McClellan S. 3681, 89th Congress, 2d Session (1964); Arnold, A Federal Unfair
Competition Law, 57 Trademark Rep. 87 (Feb. 1967).
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of the courts to evolve unfair competition law; and to do this by draw-
ing from the treaty power, from treaties, and from the commerce clause
of the United States Constitution." 90 By proper employment of the
commerce clause and the treaty power of the Constitution, the authority
stripped from the courts by Sears and Compco would be returned again,
allowing them to develop all areas of unfair competition law.
Subsection (5) gives the federal courts blanket jurisdiction, by
stating: "Any act in Commerce which results or is likely to result in
misappropriation of quasi-property of another, not otherwise protected
by Federal statute . . ." 91 This is an admittedly direct effort to enact
into law the Supreme Court's INS decision which has been common
law for nearly fifty years, and with which we have the benefit of long
experience as to what courts do with the vague and undefined express-
ion "misappropriation of quasi-property." The legislators apparently
feel that INS has stood the test of time well, with the courts rarely going
astray in applying its principles.
The American Bar Association, United States Trademark Associa-
tion, and the National Coordinating Committee (thirty-six legal and
business groups including the first three above) all worked together to
cause the introduction of S. 1154, the Proposed Unfair Competition Act
of 1967 in the 90th Congress and gave it full support.
9 2
Conclusion
In legislating to clarify these overlapping areas of statutory and
common law, Congress has accepted a job rightfully theirs and long
overdue. It may be said with certainty that the resultant federal law
will be far from perfect since the equation of free enterprise with fair
competitive practices is virtually impossible. The Congressmen seem,
however, completely aware of the spectre of excessive governmental
interference in business as well as the other pitfalls and limitations in-
volved in achieving the passage of equitable and operative new laws.
When the pending, or subsequent bills, are finally signed into law, the
judiciary shall hopefully have a set of workable guidelines designed to
raise the morality standards for all business dealings, provide a modi-
cum greater protection for creators and artists to whom our culture has
been entrusted, and negate any future debilitating effects of the Sears
and Compco holdings. Furthermore, they may even hold the future
prospect of welcomed federal assistance through affected administrative
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission or a federal prosecuting
attorney at least in cases involving interstate commerce alleging acts
of unfair competition involving intellectual products of the public do-
main.
90 McClellan S. 3681, 89th Congress 2d Session (1966) Re-introduced as McClellan
S. 1154, 90th Congress, 1st Session (1967).
91 Ibid.
92 Supra note 84.
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